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declaratory judgment at an earlier stage of their dealings.
In another case,35 the Supreme Court, per Chief Justice
Moschzisker, said that the declaratory judgments act is an
excellent piece of legislation when kept within proper
bounds. To summarize, a declaratory judgment will not be
granted: 1. When the court is asked to decide moot or
imaginary cases that do not exist in fact. 36 2. When a mere
advisory opinion is asked for, to which the answer would
not be binding, and the judgment rendered would not be
res judicata2' 3. Where the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or the parties.3 8 4. Where there is an-
other statutory remedy available which has been specially
provided for the particular type of case. 9 5. Where the
court is asked to pass upon future rights in anticipation of
an event that may not happen, unless special circumstances
warrant an immediate decision and all parties appear in
court."0
C. Richard Iobst
LIABILITY OF DRAWER ON FORGED ENDORSE-
MENTS OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
As a general rule,1 the drawer-depositor, upon showing
a forged endorsement on his check, is permitted to recover
the amount paid thereon by the drawee-bank. The reason
for this rule is that there is a contract implied from the
relation of the parties and from general business custom,
between the bank and its depositor, to the effect that the
former is to pay the latter's check to. the person designated
85 Taylor v. Haverford Township, supra.
36Bell Telephone Co. v. Lansdowne Borough, supra.
37Carter et al., School Directors v. Blakely Borough School Dist-
rict, supra.
3SAdditional Law Judge, 53rd Judicial District, supra.
3 9Shallenberger v. Shallenberger, supra.
40,Conemaugh Iron Works Co. v. Delano Coal Co., 298 Pa. 182
(1929).
'Cf. 52 A. L. R. 1297; 22 A. .L R. 1228.
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by the depositor and to none other. If a check is payable
to order, the bank has authority to pay it only to the payee
named or to another person who becomes the holder by
genuine endorsement. In other words, it is the duty of the
bank to pay out the depositor's funds only according to his
order, and payment on a forged endorsement does not fol-
low the order originally given, gives the bank-no right to
debit the account of the depositor for the amount so paid,
and is held to be payment out of the bank's own funds.2
However, courts have held that the circumstances sur-
rounding the issuance of the check may relieve the drawee
from the operation of the general rule under one of two
theories. The first is that the primary intention of the
drawer is that the check is to be used by the person with
whom he is dealing, notwithstanding the fact that he has
been deceived as to the identity of that person, and that if
such jerson endorses the name of the person he was
thought to be, there is no forgery since the check has been
endorsed by the person intended to endorse. The second
theory is that the credulity and gullibility of the drawer in
allowing himself to be imposed upon prevents his seeking
shelter under the forgery,--an application of the rule that
"as between two innocent persons, he who by his acts
makes loss possible, must bear it".
In situations where the imposter impersonates the
payee named in the check the cases in Pennsylvania adopt
the first theory.8 These decisions of our courts can only be
justified, if they are to be justified at all, as a reliance upon
the rule of the law merchant which is embodied in Sec. 9,
sub-sec. 3 of our Negotiable Instruments Act of 1901,'
which states as follows: "The instrument is payable to
bearer * * * * when it is payable to the order of a fictitious
2Snyder v. Corn Exchange National Bank, 221 Pa. 599; McNeely
v. Bank of N. A., 221 Pa. 588, 593; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Mellon Nat'l. Bank, 276 Pa. 212; Houser v. National Bank of Chain-
bersburg, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 613.
3Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern National Bank, 196
Pa. 230; Snyder v. Corn Exchange National BAnk, 221 Pa. 599.
'4Cay 16, P. L. 194.
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or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person
making it so payable". Now, it will be seen from an exam-
ination of this section that the intention of the drawer is
the controlling fact as to whether the payee named is a
fictitious person; and, that the instrument be treated as
payable to bearer because of the non-existence of the payee
named, knowledge of that fact by the drawer is essential.
The payee named is a fictitious person within the purview
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, if the drawer "intended
to use his (payee's) name, and did use it, as that of a per-
son who should never receive the checks nor have any right
to them". "The intent of the drawer of the check in insert-
ing the name of the payee is the test of whether the payee
is a fictitious person."'  It would be puerile and absurd to
ay that the actual intention of the drawer of the instru-
ment in these cases of direct impersonation is that the
payee named "should never receive the checks nof have
any right to them", or that the drawer had actual knowledge
of the non-existence of the named payee. However, some
force might be accredited to the argument that the "legal"
intention of the drawer, arising from his negligence in fail-
ing to ascertain the true state of affairs, is that the payee
named is a fictitious person; or that the drawer has know-
ledge "in law" of the non-existence of the named payee, due
to the same consideration, viz., his negligence. But this is,
in effect, to adopt the second theory of liability of the
drawer,-to apply the rule that "as between two persons,
he who by his acting makes loss possible, must bear it".
It would seem that the courts might to farther and fare
far worse than to abandon the intent theory entirely, and
confine their decisions in these cases to a consideration of
the facts with a view to applying thereto the second, the
negligence, theory. To say that the actual intent of the
drawer is that the instrument is to be paid to the person
with whom he is dealing is, as was said in a Rhode Island
5Snyder v. Corn Exchange National Bank, 221 Pa. 599. See also
National Union Fire Insurance Company.v. Mellon National Bank,
276 Pa. 212.
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case,6 a downright "perversion of words". Section 23 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act recognizes and adopts the
estoppel theory, and by the use of the word "precluded"
rejects the intent theory. If the actual intention of the
drawer of the instrument is that the person with whom he
is dealing shall use it, there is no necessity for "precluding"
the drawer from setting up the forgery. The Negotiable
Instruments Act was not the work of novices, but on the
contrary, its framers were men learned in the law, who
submitted the results of their labors only after years of
arduous research and profound application to the subject.
It is not the purpose of this note to consider the
various types, of cases calling for an application of the
principles here involved, e. g., the direct impersonation
cases, the cases in which the mails have been employed for
the purpose of impersonation, etc. We will therefore ad-
dress ourselves to a more particular consideration of the
cases in which there has been no impersonation,-no mis-
representation of identity by the impostor in persona pro-
pria,-but where the misrepresentation has been one as to
agency,-where the impostor falsely represents that he is
the agent of the named payee, thereby procures the draw-
ing of the check, and thereafter forges the endorsement on
which it is honored and paid by the drawee-bank.
Whatever may be said in support of an application
of the intent theory in the direct impersonation cases, in
situations involving pretended agency it is apparent at first
glance that it can have no application, because obviously
it is not the primary intention of the drawer that the al-
leged agent use the instrument, and hence, the check has
not been endorsed by the person intended to endorse.
Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides
as follows: "When a signature is forged or made without
the authority of the person whose signature it purports to
be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the in-
strument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce pay-
ment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired
6Tolman v. American National Bank, 22 R. I. 402, 48 At. 480.
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through or under such signature, unless the party, against
whom it is sought to enforce such right, is precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority".
There is no decision in Pennsylvania, nor is there any
provision in the act itself, specifying what particular acts
will preclude the drawer of the instrument from setting up
the forgery.7 In the absence of any judicial or statutory
specifications of what particular circumstances will raise an
estoppel against the drawer, the courts have laid down a
rule, which has been variously expressed, to the effect that
such acts as will charge the drawer with having been the
proximate cause of the loss resulting from forgery of an
endorsement will constitute grounds for an estoppel.8 "The
drawer must use the care of a man of ordinary prudence."
"The question is whether, in view of the nature of the
transaction and the situation of the parties, the drawer of
the check omitted to use ordinary care and prudence."9
"Where the loss is the result of the drawer's own fault or
neglect, he has no standing to complain of the action of
the bank in paying the check." 10
It follows, therefore, that the only question presented
by any case is whether, in view of all the circumstances, the
drawer was so negligent in drawing the check and deliver-
ing it to the pretended agent as to become the proximate
cause of the loss resulting from the forged endorsement
by the alleged agent. These cases present a situation with
regard to which the authorities in Pennsylvania, at first
glance, appear to be in direct conflict. There are two
cases' in Pennsylvania which in their broad, general es-
sentials are similar, and which present diametrically op-
'Cf. Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l. Bank, 196 Pa.
230; Iron City Nat'l. Bank v. Fort Pitt Nat'l. Bank, 159 Pa. 46;
Marcus v. People's Nat'l. Bank, 57 Pa. Super. Ct. 345.
8Falconi v. Magee, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 560.
"Houser v. National Bank of Chambersburg, 27 Pa. Super Ct. 613.
'0Marcus v. People's National Bank, 57 Pa. Super. Ct. 345, citing
Iron 'qity National Bank v. Fort Pitt National Bank, 159 Pa. 46, and
Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern National Bank, 196 Pa. 230.
"Houser v. National Bank of Chambersburg and Marcus v,
People's National Bank, supra.
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posite conclusions on what are ostensibly similar facts.
There are, however, distinguishing features in the two cases
which, perhaps, permit of their being reconciled. In both
cases the impostor fraudulently represented that he was the
agent of the payee named in the check. In the Marcus
case, however, the payee was a non-existent person, and
the court justified its conclusion in holding the drawer-
depositor liable, on the ground that he had put into circula-
tion an instrument which was not susceptible of genuine
endorsement, and in so doing had exposed the bank to ex-
traordinary risks which he had no right to expect it could
guard against. In the Houser case, on the other hand, the
named payee was a real person whom the pretended agent,
as her attorney, had represented in other previous transac-
tions; too, the pretended agent was a member of the bar
in good repute among other members of the same bar, and
the drawer of the check throughout the transaction was
represented by competent counsel. The court took into
consideration all these circumstances in order to show that,
despite ordinarily prudent precautions, the drawer had
nevertheless been imposed upon, and held the drawee-bank
liable for the loss.
The Houser case seems to represent the better position,
and is in accord with the general doctrine obtaining in this
class of cases in other jurisdictions.12 It is to be seriously
doubted whether the drawer of the check in the Marcus
case did not exercise the care of a man of ordinary pru-
dence. The pretended agent was a member of the bar of
Lackawanna County, and in pursuance of the fraud he pro-
duced pretended muniments of title to the land on which,
as security, he sought to and did obtain advances of money
in the form of checks to which he attached the forged en-
dorsements of the payees named. It is a question of con-
siderable nicety as to whether an ordinarily careful and
prudent man would not have done as the drawer there did,
in the circumstances. The court, in the Marcus case, failed
to advert to the well-recognized distinction between cases
2 ?. Z  A. L. R. 1228. 1249, and cases there cited.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
of impersonation and pretended agency, but apparently
relied on general statements in the case of Land Title &
Trust Company v. Northwestern National Bank,'3 to the effect
that there is a duty incumbent upon the depositor not to
subject the bank to extraordinary risks, such as entrusting
a check to one who, he had reason to suppose, would make
a fraudulent use of it. The Marcus case has been cited and
the principles therein laid down quoted and impliedly ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in National Union Fire Insur-
ance Company v. Mellon National Bank,'14 and in Market Street
Title & Trust Company v. Chelten Trust Company.'5 Neither
of these cases involved situations where the check was
procured and the endorsement forged by a pretended agent,
and for that reason it is of importance to note that in
neither case was it necessary to refer to the distinction
between such cases and cases of impersonation of the
named payee. Nor did the Supreme Court in either case
take cognizance of the failure of the Superior Court in the
Marcus case to mark the aforesaid distinction. However,
if, as the court in the Marcus case decides, the drawer was
so negligent as to become the proximate cause of the loss
resulting from the forged endorsement, 'the result ulti-
mately reached therein is to be commended.
As has been reiterated time and time again in our de-
cisions, the primary duty of determining, and the conse-
quences of a failure to so determine the genuineness of the
eiidorsement, are upon the bank which pays the check. 16
If the bank is to avoid liability for the failure to perform
this duty, it must affirmatively show that the drawer was
at equal or greater fault. The mere fact that there is a
duty incumbent upon the drawer to determine the fact and
the extent of the pretended agent's authority is not suf-
ficient to shift the liability. The mere delivery of an order
instrument to another is not such an act as will charge the
drawer with being the proximate cause of the loss result-
18196 Pa. 230.
24276 Pa. 212, 218.
25296 Pa. 230, 236.
IOMcNeeley v. Bank, 221 Pa. 588.
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ing from the forgery of an endorsement by the person thus
given possession of the instrument.'7 Nor is the fact that
the drawer himself was deceived in the transaction which
led to the giving of the check sufficient, of itself, to pre-
clude him from holding the bank to its contract with him
to pay his checks only to the payee or to one who claims
through a genuine endorsement.'" As was well said in the
Houser case,-"The law of the relation between a bank and
its depositors does not hold the latter to the extremely high
degree of care which would make it impossible for an im-
postor to obtain from him a check payable to his alleged
principal. While the drawer of a check may be liable where
he draws the instrument in such an incomplete state as to
facilitate or invite fraudulent alteration, it is not the law
that he is bound so to prepare the check that no one else
can successfully tamper with it. The same principle ap-
plies to the delivery of the check. Where it is not actually
delivered into the hands of the payee, but is given to his
pretended agent, the drawer must use the care of a man of
ordinary prudence, in view of all the circumstances; but
having done that, he is not precluded by the fact that he
was deceived in the transaction which led to the giving of
the check, from holding the bank to its contract with him
to pay his checks only to the payee or to one who claims
through a genuine endorsement".
Joseph A. Caffrey
17Falconi v. Magee, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 560.
"'Houser v. National Bank of Chambersburg, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 613.
